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LEGISLATURES AND SOCIAI, CHANGE: A CROSS-NATIONAL STUDY 
OF KENYA, KOREA, AND TURKEY 
The aim of t h i s  paper is t o  analyze t h e  developmental r o l e  of 
l e g i s l a t u r e s  i n  developing soc ie t i e s .  I n  t h e  l a s t  two decades a massive 
corpus of l i t e r a t u r e  has been produced on t h e  subject  of developing p o l i t i e s .  
However, much of it has concentrated on such key i n s t i t u t i o n s  a s  the  
mi l i t a ry ,  charismatic leadership,  p o l i t i ~ a l ~ p a r t i e s ,  and public bureaucracy, 
o f t en  neglect ing the  representa t ive  bodies. The reason f o r  t h i s  neglect  
is  the  impl ic i t  assumption t h a t  l e g i s l a t u r e s  of developing s o c i e t i e s  do 
not play a s i g n i f i c a n t  ro le .  I n  a l imited sense it is t r u e  t h a t  l e g i s l a t u r e s  
tend t o  exercise l i t t l e  power over lawmaking. But it  is equally t r u e  t h a t  
they perform functions w e l l  beyond lawmaking alone. The p o l i t i c a l  
s igni f icance  of these l e g i s l a t u r e s  is l i k e l y  t o  be embedded i n  these 
non-lawnraking functions. 
Recently, Almond and Powell have urged us  t o  examine t h e  l e g i s l a t u r e s  
more c lose ly ,  which they argued were "usually neglected i n  'Third World' 
l i t e r a t u r e "  but "deserve some descr ip t ion and analys is .  112 Aware t h a t  t h e  
l e g i s l a t u r e s  do not  play a major r o l e  i n  lawmaking, a function which is 
of ten  preempted by the  executive branches, one should f r u i t f u l l y  look 
elsewhere t o  Iden t i fy  s i g n i f i c a n t  contr ibutions t h a t  a l e g i s l a t u r e  can make 
f o r  s o c i a l  change. I n  two most recent  e f f o r t s  t o  synthesize research 
f indings  emerging from comparative l e g i s l a t i v e  behaviors severa l  key 
funct ional  aspects  have been i d e n t i f i e d e 3  These functions were empirical ly 
derived a f t e r  a ca re fu l  sc ru t iny  of d iverse  a c t i v i t i e s  i n  which these  
l e g i s l a t u r e s  and t h e i r  individual  members engage and thus,  have cross- 
na t iona l  app l i cab i l i ty .  Loewenberg and Patterson have iden t i f i ed  th ree  
such functions: l inkage (or representa t ion) ,  c o n f l i c t  management, and 
leadership r e ~ r u i t m e n t . ~  I n  addit ion,  even though they did not include 
it on t h e i r  formal list of functions, they gave an extensive treatment of 
the  system maintenance functions with a spec ia l  reference t o  c i t i z e n s '  
support f o r  t h e  l eg i s l a tu re .5  I n  a much s imi la r  way Mezey's recent  work, 
which focuses upon developing l e g i s l a t u r e s  more extensively,  lists t h e  
functions of policy making, representat ion,  and system maintenance. 
Furthermore, Mezey subsumes under t h e  system maintenance t h e  sub-functions 
of p o l i t i c a l  recruitment and public support.7 Taken together,  these  
recent  works suggest t h a t  the  l e g i s l a t u r e s  perform c e r t a i n  common functions,  
and it is through t h e  ana lys i s  of these  functions t h a t  we can assess  t h e  
developmental r o l e  of l eg i s l a tu res .  
With regard t o  t h e  s p e c i f i c  r o l e  of l e g i s l a t u r e s  a s  change agents,  
eome scholars  have expressed doubts about t h e i r  p o t e n t i a l  contr ibutions.  
Huntington and Nelson have summarily dismissed t h e  l e g i s l a t u r e s  as a 
progressive p o l i t i c a l  force,  especia l ly  i n  t h e  context of achieving 
socioeconomic equity through land reform measures. They have asserted:  
"Parliaments a r e  the  enemy of land reform, and a modest body of p o l i t i c a l  
pa r t i c ipan t s  is l i k e l y  t o  have t he  i n t e r e s t  and the  means t o  obstruct  
t he  approval and implementation of such re f  oms .  "8 Packenham concurs 
with t h i s  view and even extends it t o  o ther  general r o l e s  of l eg i s l a t u r e s  
f o r  modernization and development .9 These arguments a r e  premised on two 
key assumptions: one is t ha t  t h e  majority of l e g i s l a t i v e  members a r e  
recrui ted  from privileged soc i a l  groups wfth vested i n t e r e s t  i n  s t a t u s  
_quo including land tenure system, and another, because of t h e i r  soc i a l  
o r ig ins  t he  l e g i s l a t i v e  e l i t e s  tend t o  embrace e s sen t i a l l y  conservative 
ideology, o f ten  "more inclined t o  resist modernization than po u l a r l y  
e lec ted executives and even nonelective au thor i t a r i an  elites. JO 
Whether l eg i s l a t u r e s  contribute t o  t he  process of developmental 
changes o r  impede it is i n  t h e  f i n a l  analys is  a matter of empirical 
investigation.  We w i l l  explore t h i s  question i n  the  context of th ree  
countries: Kenya, Korea, and Turkey. The data  f o r  analys is  were obtained 
by means of d i r e c t  interviews with th ree  population groups involved i n  
the  l e g i s l a t i v e  process: members of parliament, l o c a l  leaders ,  and 
adul t  c i t i zens .  11 Altogether we  completed interviews with 252 MPs, 
1203 l o c a l  leaders ,  and 8411 adul t  c i t i z ens  i n  t he  three  countries.  
I. Legis la tures  and Development 
A t  the  ou t se t  i t  is necessary t o  s t a t e  e x p l i c i t l y  t h e  connections 
between the  functions t ha t  l eg i s l a t u r e s  perform and development. Without 
t h i s  considerat ion our subsequent discussion of l e g i s l a t i v e  functions 
cannot shed much l i g h t  on the  developmental r o l e  of representa t ive  bodies. 
Social  development is  a multifaceted phenomenon and i ts  contents may 
vary from socie ty  t o  socie ty  depending upon t h e i r  spec i f i c  soc i a l  
conditions and t h e i r  developmental goals. However, there  appears t o  be 
ce r t a i n  common core values tha t  a l l  developing soc i e t i e s  seek t o  rea l i ze .  
These include: p o l i t i c a l  in tegra t ion,  mass p o l i t i c a l  pa r t i c ipa t ion  
and involvement, equity i n  d i s t r i bu t i on  of wealth, and legit imation.  12 
Legislatures a r e  sure ly  not t he  only i n s t i t u t i o n s  t h a t  may promote these 
development values. There a r e  other i n s t i t u t i o n s  such a s  the  executive, 
p o l i t i c a l  par ty ,  i n t e r e s t  group and mi l i t a ry ,  a l l  of which may contr ibute  
i n  t h e i r  own ways t o  development. The question t h a t  concerns us is: 
whether the  l eg i s l a t u r e  does anything i n  t he  way of promoting these values. 
I f  the  l eg i s l a t u r e  engages i n  any kind of a c t i v i t i e s  t ha t  a f f e c t  these 
developmental values, one may take these a c t i v i t i e s  a s  defining its 
developmental ro le .  
Recent l i t e r a t u r e  suggests a list of functions common t o  a l l  developing 
l eg i s la tu res :  representat ion,  p o l i t i c a l  pa r t i c ipa t ion ,  resource a l locat ion,  
and legit imation.13 The extent  t o  which a l eg i s l a t u r e  performe these 
functions indicates  i t s  contribution t o  development. Representation 
f o s t e r s  not only a sense of involvement among c i t i z ens  a t  the  periphery 
but a lso ,  provides a d i r ec t  channel of communication and contact with 
the  government a t  the  center. The re la t ionship  between representat ion 
and p o l i t i c a l  in tegra t ion is c l ea r  enough, requiring l i t t l e  elaboration 
here. 
Figure 1: Legis la t ive  Functions and Development 
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The l eg i s l a t u r e  o f f e r s  an i n s t i t u t i o n a l  framework i n  which c i t i z en  
par t i c ipa t ion  aan expand. In  most countries members of the  l eg i e l a tu r e  
a r e  popularly elected i n  a per iodic .e lec t ion,  which provides regular  
opportunit ies f o r  the  people t o  exercise t h e i r  voting r i gh t s .  Such 
e lec to ra l  pa r t i c ipa t ion  may not however represent a strong form of 
c i t i z en  involvement i n  some developing soc ie t i es .  Voting is one of the  
eas ies t  forms of pa r t i c ipa t ion  requiring r e l a t i ve ly  l i t t l e  p o l i t i c a l  
knowledge and commitment. Consequently, many of those who exercise 
t h e i r  voting r i gh t s  o f ten  do so i n  deference t o  government au tho r i t i e s  
and o f f i c i a l  ideology o r  because of community pressure. In  t h i s  instance,  
it seems d i f f i c u l t  t o  regard such a c t i v i t y  a s  an autonomous par t ic ipat ion.  14* 
Rather, it is a par t i c ipa t ion  of a mobilized var ie ty .  An increase i n  
mobilized par t i c ipa t ion  should not  be regarded a s  development because it 
is not an a c t  of eelf-conscious and se l f -asser t ive  choice. In  a more 
important way, the  l eg i s l a t u r e  f o s t e r s  c i t i z e n  involvement by creat ing 
non-electoral opportunit ies f o r  par t ic ipat ion.  These non-electoral 
opportunit ies tend t o  st imulate pa r t i c ipa t ion  of more autonomous so r t s ,  
such a s  at tending meetings organized by an MP, ta lk ing t o  him about 
personal o r  community problems, seeking an MP's ass i s tance  fo r  lobbying 
government agencies. Because of t h e i r  e l e c to r a l  t i e s  t o  spec i f i c  geographic 
consti tuencies,  MPs a r e  l i k e l y  t o  be most v i s i b l e  and access ible  public 
f igures  from the  point of view of ordinary c i t i zens .  By v i r t u e  of t h i s  f a c t ,  
individual  MPs can promote ac t ive  c i t i z e n  par t ic ipat ion.  
AJ.1 l e g i s l a t o r s  provide a measure of constituency senrice. Par t  of 
it may involve an e f f o r t  t o  bring government resources t o  t h e  d i s t r i c t  
i n  t he  form of public work projects .  They may exer t  pressure on government 
agencies t o  make spec ia l  a l loca t ion  of funds f o r  a school building, road 
construction, reclamation project ,  housing, and i ndus t r i a l  project ,  a l l  
of which can benef i t  the  people of a d i s t r i c t .  Competition fo r  these  
"pork barre ls"  among individual  MPs, especia l ly  when they perceive a d i r e c t  
l i n k  between t h e i r  success of obtaining "pork barre l"  p ro jec t s  and t h e i r  
chance f o r  ree lect ion,  may r e s u l t  in a more equi table  regional  d i s t r i bu t i on  
of resources than otherwise possible. Bureaucrats i n  t h e  cen t r a l  government 
in charge of economic growth planning are more l i k e l y  t o  be preoccupied 
with t he  growth e t ra tegy of nat ional  economy, o f ten  ignoring t he  var iab le  
needs of each d i s t r i c t .  I n  contras t ,  l e g i s l a t o r s  elected from these  
d i s t r i c t s  cannot disregard t he  development requirements of t h e i r  d i s t r i c t s .  
This spec ia l  t ie  t o  a geographic constituency makes MPs o r i en t  t h e i r  
a c t i v i t i e s  toward r ed i s t r i bu t i ng  t he  f r u i t s  of economic development. 
Collect ively,  members of parliament may a c t  a s  a countervail ing force  
t o  the  growth centered s t ra tegy  of t h e  executive branch. Thus, one 
important contribution t h a t  a l eg i s l a t u r e  can make toward development 
is through its r o l e  i n  resource a l loca t ion  with its propensity towards 
r ed i s t r i bu t i ve  po l ic ies .  
Legislatures can enhance t he  legitimacy of t h e  regime through i t e  
a c t i v i t i e s .  Packenham suggests hree main ways by which a l eg i s l a t u r e  
can help legi t imate  t he  regime.15 F i r s t ,  it contributes t o  legitimacy 
by simply "meeting regular ly  and uninterruptedly" i n  accordance with t h e  
const i tu t ion.  Be c a l l s  i t  a l a t e n t  legi t imat ion because it produces, by 
j u s t  being there,  an aura of legitimacy f o r  t he  regime of which t h e  
l eg i s l a t u r e  is a par t .  Second, it can ac t i ve ly  legi t imate  t he  policy 
ac t ions  of t h e  government by a t taching its s e a l s  of approval. He c a l l s  i t  
a manifest legit imation.  Third, t he  l eg i s l a t u r e  may serve a s  a "eafety 
valve" fo r  p o l i t i c a l  tension. Tensions accumulated i n  t h e  socie ty  can 
be openly a i r ed  and t h e i r  pressures released through parliamentary debates. 
There is yet  another way i n  which t h e  l eg i s l a t u r e  contr ibutes  t o  legit imation,  
which may be cal led  a "spill-over" e f fec t .  Where a l eg i s l a t u r e  performs 
its cons t i tu t iona l ly  charged functions w e l l  enough, it dl1 e n l i s t  a broad 
base of popular support and respect .  The reservoir  of support and respect  
accrued t o  the  l e g i s l a t i v e  i n s t i t u t i o n  may a f f e c t  t he  c i t i zene '  baeic 
a t t i t u d e s  toward other  pa r t s  of government. Of course, t h i s  is  t r u e  only 
when the  c i t i z ens  regard the  l e g i s l a t u r e  a s  an i n t eg ra l  pa r t  of t h e  regime 
o r  when a l a rge  majority of the  population a r e  incapable of c l e a r l y  
d is t inguishing the  two branches of government. In  many developing soc i e t i e s  
c i t i z ens  tend t o  regard various branches of government as an indist inguishable 
whole, pa r t l y  due t o  t h e i r  r e l a t i ve ly  shor t  h i s t o r i e s  of p o l i t i c a l  
independence o r  because of t h e i r  low l eve l s  of education. 
11. Representation 
The term 'representation' de f i e s  an easy def in i t ion.  l6 It has been 
used and abused i n  many d i f f e r en t  contexts. Because i t  is not our in tent ion 
t o  engage i n  a deta i led  conceptual analysis ,  we simply s t i p u l a t e  a working 
def in i t ion  fo r  the  purpose of t h i s  study. By representat ion we r e f e r  t o  
the  re la t ionship  t ha t  a l eg i s l a t o r  forges with h i s  const i tuents  i n  the  
pursui t  of h i s  dut ies .  This re la t ionship  is embedded i n  the  mutual 
expectations of r o l e  and i n  the  in te rac t ive  pa t t e rns  between an MP and 
consti tuents.  Thus, representat ion can be described and analyzed i n  
terms of r o l e  conception and the  ways i n  which t he  two groups actual ly  
in te rac t .  
We dis t inguish  two aspects of r o l e  conceptions held by both MPs 
themselves and t h e i r  consti tuents.  17 The f i r s t  aspect has t o  do with the  
kind of a c t i v i t i e s  t ha t  MPs and const i tuents  regard a s  most appropriate 
t o  the  l e g i s l a t i v e  ro le .  The second aspect r e l a t e s  t o  the  question of 
representat ional  focus, i .e. ,  the  t a rge t  group o r  groups f o r  representat ion.  
In  our th ree  country survey we asked the  respondents t o  ind ica te  the  
a c t i v i t i e s  t ha t  they consider most important t o  an MI?. The da ta  a r e  
presented by country and by population groups i n  Table 1. 
The a c t i v i t i e s  considered most important by the  const i tuents  include, 
not  surpr is ingly ,  the  matters  t ha t  d i r e c t l y  a f f e c t  them. Without 
exeeption i n  a l l  th ree  countries,  t he  MPs' duty t o  express the  views 
of people i n  the  d i s t r i c t  on po l ic ies  was singled out a s  the  most important 
job. Similarly,  they a l s o  s t ressed t he  r o l e  of the  MPs i n  the  areas  of 
inducing government projects  t o  the  d i s t r i c t  and helping t he  const i tuents  
who have problems with the  government agencies. These a r e  a l l  the  kind 
of a c t i v i t i e s  we usually assoc ia te  with MPs' constituency service  ro le .  On 
the  other hand, a majority of the  const i tuents  did not a t t r i b u t e  much 
importance t o  the  MPs' r o l e  i n  law-making o r  explaining government pol ic ies .  
I n  a l l  three  countries the  public a t t r i bu t ed  the  g rea tes t  importance t o  
the constituency service  aspect of the  MP's role .  This f inding is i n  
complete accord with some recent  s tudies  of the  l eg i s l a t u r e  i n  developing 
soc ie t i es .  18 The l oca l  notables with more sophist icated conceptions of the  
l e g i s l a t i v e  ro le ,  regarded the  MPs' r o l e  i n  the  a reas  of law-making and 
explaining government po l ic ies  a s  important, markedly more than did the  
consti tuents.  However, it is s t i l l  t he  se rv ice  oriented ro l e s  of the  MPs 
tha t  the  notables considered most important. 
In contras t  t o  the  const i tuents  and t o  the  l oca l  notables t o  a l e s s e r  
degree, the  MPs defined t h e i r  own ro l e s  d i f fe ren t ly .  With the  exception 
of the  Kenyan l eg i s l a t o r s ,  most of them emphasized t h e i r  own ro l e s  of 
law-making and explaining the  po l ic ies  of government more than o r  a t  
l e a s t  equal to,  t h e i r  d i s t r i c t  service  roles .  For instance, nearly 70 percent 
of the  Turkish l eg i s l a t o r s  regarded t h e i r  r o l e  of explaining policy a s  
TABLE I 
Bole Expectations: Aspects of Legis la t ive  Ac t i v i t i e s  Regarded 
As Important by MPs, Local Notables, and Constituents 
(percentages) 
KENYA KOREA TURKEP 
Local Cdnsti- Local Consti- Local Consti- 
Ac t iv i t i e s  MPs notables tuents  MRs notables tuents  MPs notables tuen t s  
Explaining Po l ic ies  
t o  Voters 10.7 
Proposing, debating and 
amending b i l l s  32.1 
Expressing t he  views of 
t he  people i n  
d i s t r i c t  28.6 
Obtaining government 
p ro jec t s  t o  d i s t r i c t  .71.4 
Interceding with c i v i l  
servants  f o r  d i s t r i c t  
vo te r s  28.6 
Resolving l oca l  
con£ l i c t  7.1 
Visi t ing d i s t r i c t  -.Not 
asked 
30.0 
75.0 
55.0 
40.0 
35.0 
0.0 
Not 
asked 
69.4 
41.7 
51.4 
59.7 
30.6 
16.7 
Not 
asked 
(72) 
Note: 1 
2 
3 
The HPs were asked i f  they f e l t  they should spend more t i m e ,  about the  same time, 
o r  less time on each a c t i v i t y  l i s t e d .  The percentages include those who sa id  
they ahould spend more t i m e  on these a c t i v i t i e s .  
Both the  l oca l  notables and the  const i tuents  were asked t o  r a t e  t he  importance 
of each ac t i v i t y .  The percentages include those indicat ing each a c t i v i t y  a s  
"very important". 
We have examined only those MPs i n  whose d i s t r i c t s  w e  conducted t he  mass survey. 
Consequently, t he  s i z e  of Ns f o r  t he  MPa a r e  smaller than the  t o t a l s  whom we 
interviewed i n  each l eg i s la tu re .  
very important, a s t r i k ing  contras t  with 39.4 percent of the  notables and 
18 percent of the  conati tuents who regarded t h i s  pa r t i cu la r  r o l e  a s  important. 
In  regard t o  t he  law-making ro l e ,  the  same is t rue:  while 42 percent of 
the  MPs st ressed t h i s  ro le ,  the  comparable f igures  f o r  the  notables and the  
const i tuents  were 33.4 percent and 18.6 percent, respectively.  In  Korea, 
the  law-making ro l e  was ra ted  very highly i n  importance by a l l  th ree  groups. 
Among the  MPs three-fourth s t ressed it, making it by f a r  the  most important 
r o l e  f o r  the  l eg i s la to r s .  Both the  notables and t he  const i tuents  concurred 
with it (67% and 44X, respectively).  
The importance a t t r i bu t ed  t o  the  MPs' r o l e  of law making i n  Korea 
should not ,  however, be construed t o  mean t ha t  t he  l eg i s l a t u r e  is an 
e f fec t ive  law-making body. On the  contrary, its effect iveness  i n  l eg i s l a t i on  
is i n  f a c t  minimal due t o  the  executive dominance. One reason why the  
Koreans had ra ted the  law-making so important may be re la ted  t o  t h e i r  
d is i l l i s ionment  with the  impotence of the  l eg i s la tu re .  They knew tha t  a 
strong and ac t ive  l eg i s l a t u r e  is a prerequis i te  of a l i b e r a l  democracy, a 
form of government t ha t  the  school textbooks taught them t o  a sp i r e  t o  i n  
the  l a s t  th ree  decades. But they knew tha t  the  l eg i s l a t u r e  has been reduced 
t o  a rubber-stamp organization, qu i te  contrary t o  what it should properly 
be doing. Their aspi ra t ion fo r  a strong representat ive body led  them t o  
express t h e i r  f ee l ings  that it ought t o  be more ac t ive  i n  law-making than it 
presently is. 
The Kenyan MPs provide a unique case. More than two-third of them 
(71.4%) s t ressed t h e i r  constituency service  role ,  especia l ly  t h e i r  a c t i v i t i e s  
aimed a t  obtaining government resources and del iver ing such mater ia l  
benef i ts  t o  t h e i r  d i s t r i c t s .  This r o l e  received the  highest  r a t ings  among 
both the  Kenyan notables and the  const i tuents ,  a lso .  The Kenyan MPs rega6ded 
other a c t i v i t i e s  a s  l e s s  important, and i n  comparison t o  t h e i r  counter- 
pa r t s  elsewhere, t h e i r  r o l e  perception stands i n  a marked contras t .  Evidently, 
t he  MP's r o l e  in resource a l locat ion is the  most important aspect of t h e i r  
job in Kenya. There appears t o  be a consensus on t h i s  r o l e  among t he  general 
population a s  well  a s  among the  l eg i s l a t o r s  themselves. This aspect of 
representat ion c l ea r l y  d is t inguishes  Kenya from other  countries t ha t  w e  
have s tudies .  
In  order t o  explore the  second aspect  of the  r o l e  we asked our respondents 
which group's i n t e r e s t s  an MP should seek t o  represent  most ac t ively .  We 
provided a list of relevant  groups such a s  the  i n t e r e s t s  of d i s t r i c t ,  p o l i t i c a l  
party, t he  executive, i n t e r e s t  group, personal advisors, and personal be l i e f s  
and conviction, out of which they were ins t ructed t o  choose one. The data 
a r e  summarized i n  Table 2. Somewhat d i f f e r en t  pa t t e rns  emerge i n  the  three  
countries. In  Kenya the  d i s t r i c t  served a s  the  s i ng l e  most important 
representat ional  focus. Almost 86 percent of the  notables and 78 percent 
of the  const i tuents  mentioned it. The notables regarded the  p o l i t i c a l  party,  
the  KANU i n  t h i s  case, almost a s  much important a s  the  d i s t r i c t  (73.3%). 
For the  const i tuents ,  however, the  party was not  a s  much important. In  
Korea too, a s imi lar  pa t t e rn  obtained: the  g rea tes t  importance was a t t r i bu t ed  
TABLE 2 
Role Expectations: Representational Focus 
Considered Hoat Important by Local Notables 
and Constituents 
(percentages) 
KENYA KOREA TURKEY 
Local Const i- Local Cons t i- Local Cons t i- 
Representational f o c i  notables tuen t s  notables tuents  notables tuents  
P o l i t i c a l  par ty  73.3 48.0 41.2 23.4 39.0 16.2 
Executive branch of 
government 43.0 38.7 25.6 22.6 14.6 12.2 
I n t e r e s t  group 41.7 41.2 15.2 12.1 18.8 9.3 
MP's personal advisers  25.6 26.3 7 .5  8.5 10.1 8 .1  
MP's own convictions 32.2 27.8 56.2 42.8 29.6 17.8 a 
Note: 1 The respondents were asked t o  r a t e  t h e  importance of each representa t ional  focus 
l i s t e d  above. The percentages a r e  based on those who ra ted  any focus a s  "very 
important". 
t o  t h e  d i s t r i c t  focus, followed next by p o l i t i c a l  pa r t i e s .  The Turkish p a t t e r n  
is considerably d i f f e r e n t .  P o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  were considered more important 
f o c i  than were t h e  electoral:. d i s t r i c t s ,  the  reverse  of t h e  pa t t e rns  
observed i n  o ther  two countries.  This may be due t o  t h e  c e n t r a l  r o l e  t h a t  
t h e  Turkish p a r t i e s  play i n  p o l i t i c s  and i n  p a r t  t o  a multi-member system 
being used there.  
Of spec ia l  i n t e r e s t  is a s t rong emphasis placed on t h e  personal 
convictions i n  Korea. More than hal f  of t h e  Korean notables (56.2%) f e l t  
t h a t  t h e  MPs should a c t  according t o  t h e i r  personal convictions r a t h e r  than 
anything else. Among the  const i tuents  almost a s  many (43%) held t h e  s imi la r  
views. In  comparison t o  o ther  countr ies  these  f igures  represent  subs tan t i a l ly  
higher proportions, suggesting t h a t  many Koreans th ink it  appropriate f o r  
t h e i r  MPs t o  a c t  according t o  t h e i r  personal be l i e f s ,  i .e . ,  t r u s t ee  or ienta t ions .  
It has been suggested t h a t  the  t r u s t ee  o r ien ta t ions  a r e  pa r t i cu la r ly  coygatible 
with the  prevail ing norms and expectations of leadership r o l e  i n  Korea. . The 
Confucian e th i c s  which a r e  still dominant i n  the  Korean cul ture ,  ex to l  the  
v i r t u r e  of chi jo ,  t ha t  is, being a man of pr inciple .  The leaders  with ch i jo  
have supposedly a s e t  of clear-cut personal p o l i t i c a l  philosophy, and a r e  expected 
t o  stand unflinchingly by these  principles.  Actions leading t o  a compromise 
o r  conci l ia t ion a r e  regarded a s  egregious viola t ions  of t h i s  cardinal  v i r tue .  
The prevalence of such cu l t u r a l  norms renders a t r u s t ee  or ienta t ion both 
appropriate and desirable.  
The nature of representat ion is a l s o  revealed i n  the  i n t e r ac t i ve  process 
between MPs and t h e i r  const i tuents .  I n  order t o  remain in touch with t h e i r  
d i s t r i c t s  most MPs engage i n  a wide range of a c t i v i t i e s .  These a c t i v i t i e s  
may include t h e i r  frequent v i s i t s  t o  home d i s t r i c t s ,  mailing pamphlets o r  
o ther  printed matters  t o  voters  t o  explain t h e i r  s tands on policy issues ,  
at tending t o  the  case mail, touring t h e i r  d i s t r i c t s  on speaking engagements, 
spending the  time i n  t h e i r  d i s t r i c t  o f f i c e s  t o  see  ordinary const i tuents ,  
and at tending ceremonial functions such a s  a wedding o r  funeral .  Whether 
an MP does t h i s  because of h i s  ree lect ion s t ra tegy  o r  merely out of a sense 
of h i s  duty, the  f a c t  remains t h a t  he cannot escape from the  necess i ty  of 
contact with h i s  constituency. 
However, an MP does not perceive, a s  Richa Fenno has recent ly  shown 
h i s  constituency as an indist inguishable whole.Z8 Fenno has argued t ha t  
an MP tends t o  perceive h i s  d i s t r i c t  a s  "a nes t  of concentric c i rc les"  of 
d i f fe ren t  consti tuencies:  t he  geographical, t h e  ree lect ion,  t he  primary, and 
the  personal consti tuencies.  Each ca r r i e s  a d i f f e r en t  weight i n  importance 
fo r  an MP, with the  personal constituency a t  t he  head of h i s  list followed 
by the  primary, the  ree lect ion,  and the  geographic consti tuencies.  He w i l l  
t r y  most hard t o  remain i n  good r e l a t i ons  with the  members of h i s  personal 
and primary consti tuencies,  by l i s t en ing  careful ly  t o  t h e i r  opinions and 
by giving a p r i o r i t y  t o  any request coming from them. In  a country l i k e  
the  United States,which was the  context i n  which Fenno has conducted h i s  
study, the  d i s t r i c t  p o l i t i c a l  system has usually a highly d i f fe ren t ia ted  
s t ructure .  There a r e  a mul t ip l i c i ty  of ac t ive  and wel l  organized groups, 
each based on common economic i n t e r e s t s ,  p o l i t i c a l  convictions, soc i a l  and 
cu l t u r a l  concerns, a spec i f i c  i ssue ,  o r  an ethnic iden t i ty .  These groups 
a c t  a s  the  intermediate s t r uc tu r e  of po l i t i c s .  
The s i t ua t i ons  i n  many developing soc i e t i e s  a r e  vas t ly  d i f fe ren t .  A t  
t he  d i s t r i c t  l eve l  tha, p o l i t i c a l  s t r uc tu r e  remains largely  undifferentiated.  
Nor has the  intermediate s t r uc tu r e  of organized groups a t t a ined  a l e v e l  of 
f u l l  maturation. In  the  absence of well  organized and e f fec t ive  groups, 
l o c a l  notables take  on the  functions of the  intermediate s t r uc tu r e  i n  
these soc ie t i es .  Consequently, l o c a l  notables res id ing i n  a community 
perform a c r i t i c a l  r o l e  of intermediaries between the  government a t  t he  
center  and the  grassroots people a t  the  periphery. They a r e  respected i n  
the  community f o r  t h e i r  knowledge, s t a t u s  and wealth. Their views and 
guidances a r e  eagerly sought and a r e  deferred t o  by individual  members of t h e  
collpltmity. Because of these reaaona the notables  provide a v i t a l  l i n k  i n  
both upward and downward flow of p o l i t i c a l  communicatfon. 
I n  an e l e c t o r a l  d i s t r i c t  l o c a l  notables a r e ,  i n  some sense, rough 
equivalent t o  what Fenno would c a l l  t h e  members of an MP's personal o r  
primary consti tuencies.  Without t h e i r  support he  has l i t t l e  chance t o  
win in elec t ion.  Without t h e i r  cooperations he cannot penet ra te  e f fec t ive ly  
i n t o  h i s  constituency, nor can he l ea rn  major concerns of h i e  voters .  I n  
f a c t ,  a preponderant majori ty of the  MPs interviewed mentioned t h e  names of 
l o c a l  notables when we asked them whom they p a r t i c u l a r l y  t r y  t o  see back 
i n  t h e i r  h m e  d i s t r i c t s .  The proportions of MPs who sought most t o  see 
t h e i r  l o c a l  notables  were: 85.7% i n  Kenya, 69.7% i n  Korea, and 91.3% i n  
Turkey. This evidence a t t e s t s  t o  t h e  important r o l e  of l o c a l  leadership in 
developing s o c i e t i e s .  
Because any form of in te rac t ion  involves a t  a mininnrm two p a r t i e s ,  we  
examine the  subject  from two sides:  MPs on t h e  one hand and t h e  repreeented 
on t h e  other.  Turning t o  MPa and the  ways i n  which they try t o  keep i n  
touch with t h e i r  const i tuenciea,  w e  see s i g n i f i c a n t  va r ia t ions  by country 
(see Table 3 ) .  Almost on a l l  the  constituency a c t i v i t i e s  examined, t h e  
Kenyan MPs showed t h e  highest  l e v e l  of activism. They reported t h a t  they 
had returned t o  t h e i r  home d i s t r i c t s  an average of 4.5 t i m e s  each month. I n  
comparison, t h e  Korean and Turkish l e g i s l a t o r s  v i s i t e d  t h e i r  d i s t r i c t s  1 .5  
and 2 .6  t i m e s ,  respectively.  Looking a t  t h e  average number of days each 
l e g i s l a t o r  spends i n  h i s  constituency per  month, t h e  Kenyan MPs showed an 
impressive record. They spent 14.8  days in d i s t r i c t ,  dividing t h e i r  t i m e  
equally between t h e i r  sojourns i n  Nairobi and i n  t h e i r  const i tuencies.  The 
MPs of o ther  countries spent much shor te r  time i n  t h e i r  d i s t r i c t s :  5.9 days 
in Korea and 9.1  days i n  Turkey. These f indings  a r e  not surpr is ing,  because 
we  have already seen the highest  p r i o r i t y  t h a t  t h e  Kenyans at tached t o  
the  se rv ice  aspect  of the  l e g i s l a t i v e  ro le .  
Other v a r i a t i o n s  e x i s t ,  a lso .  The volume of mails coming t o  an MI?, 
t h e  number of d i s t r i c t  vo te r s  he sees ,  the  number of p e t i t i o n s  he sponsors 
f o r  h i s  voters ,  and t h e  number of times he publishes l e a f l e t s  and d i s t r i b u t e s  
them in t h e  d i s t r i c t ,  a l l  vary from country t o  country. Of p a r t i c u l a r  
i n t e r e s t  is t h e  number of voters  the  MPs entertained.  In  a l l  th ree  
countr ies  the  MPs m e t  with a number of t h e i r  vo te r s  everqldqy. I n  Kenya, the  
MPs reported t h a t  they had received 37.4  vote r s  per  week. I n  Korea and 
Turkey, t h e  l e g i s l a t o r s  met with even a g rea te r  number: 44.5 persons and 
38.2  persons, respect ively .  It is i n t e r e s t i n g  t o  note t h a t  t h e  Kenyans 
published l e a f l e t s  f a r  more frequently than did t h e i r  colleagues i n  other  
countries.  Many f a c t o r s  undoubtedly a f f e c t  the  l e v e l  of an MPts a c t i v i t i e s  
i n  h i s  d i s t r i c t ,  including among o the rs  t h e  s i z e  of h i s  d i s t r i c t ,  its 
proximity t o  t h e  nat ion 's  c a p i t a l ,  the  accepted means of s o c i a l  communication, 
h i s  se l f - ro le  perceptions and h i s  p o l i t i c a l  ambition. 
The in te rac t ion  pa t t e rn  could be analyzed from t h e  standpoint of 
const i tuents ,  too. How extensive contacts  do const i tuents  maintain with 
TABLE 3 
MP's Constituency A c t i v i t i e s  i n  Three Countries 
A c t i v i t i e s  
Kenyan Korean Turkish 
MPs MPs MPs 
How o f t e n  do you v i s i t  your d i s t r i c t  
each month? 4 .5  t i m e s  1.5  t i m e s  2 .6  times 
How many days do you spend i n  
d i s t r i c t  each month? 14.8 days 5 . 9  days 9 . 1  days 
How many l e t t e r s  do you ge t  from 
your constituency a week? 18.6 l e t t e r s  34.1  l e t t e r s  27.7 l e t t e r s  
How many p e t i t i o n s  do you receive  
from your consituency each 
session? 13.2 p e t i t i o n s  21.6 p e t i t i o n s  N.A. 
How many of your vo te r s  come t o  see  
v you each week? 37.4  vo te r s  44.5 vo te r s  38.2 vo te r s  
How many times a year  do you publish 
l e a f l e t s  explaining p o l i c i e s  and 
your pos i t ions  on them? 11.8 times 
Who a r e  t h e  people you most o f t en  
t r y  t o  see i n  d i s t r i c t  (% of MPs 
who t r i e d  t o  s e e  l o c a l  
notables)  85.7% 
2 . 6  times 2.5  t i m e s  
Note: 1 The responses t o  t h i s  open ended quest ion were f i r s t  coded i n  terms of s p e c i f i c  
types of people a. MP sought t o  see. For the  purpose of da ta  presenta t ion  we 
have collasped our de ta i l ed  ca tegor ies  i n t o  two groups: l o c a l  notables and 
ordinary voters .  
P 2  The appointed members were not  included. 
t h e i r  MPs, and how? The contact  da ta  from the  th ree  countr ies  a r e  surm~arized 
i n  Table 4. Two general aspects  of t h e  data  deserve some comprents. -The 
f i r s t  poia t  r e l a t e s  t o  t h e  consiatent  tendency among t h e  Kenyan c i t i zens ,  
more than among anyone e l se ,  t o  maintain a c lose  contact  with t h e i r  MPs, 
which is something one can e a s i l y  expect knowing t h e i r  inc l ina t ion  t o  
stress the  se rv ice  aspect  of the  l e g i s l a t i v e  ro le .  They indicated t h a t  
they had seen t h e i r  MPs an average of 1.3 times i n  t h e  recent  six month 
period, in con t ras t  t o  a minimal 0.3 times reported i n  both Korea and 
Turkey. The const t tuents  i n  Kenya s a w  t h e  MJ?s a s  much a s  four  times more 
f requent ly  than did  t h e  const i tuents  i n  o ther  countries.  Their contacts  
were a l s o  markedly more extensive i n  o ther  respects:  12 percent reported 
t h a t  they had talked personally t o  the  MPs i n  Nairobi (only 1% i n  Korea 
and 3% i n  mrkey) ;  49 percent could t e l l  us  some s p e c i f i c  th ings  t h a t  
t h e i r  MPs had done i n  t h e  d i s t r i c t ;  and 4 percent claimed t h a t  t h e  MPs had 
helped them with personal problems. Compared t o  the  const i tuents  i n  
Korea and Turkey, t h e  Kenyans enjoyed t h e  most a c t i v e  contact  with t h e i r  
representat ives.  
The second point  had t o  do with t h e  l o c a l  notables1 contacts  
with MPs. Without any exception they maintained g r e a t l y  more extensive 
contact  than did the  ordinary const i tuents  i n  a l l  a reas  t h a t  w e  exariined. 
They saw the  MPs more frequently both i n  the  c a p i t a l  and i n  t h e  d f s t r i c t ,  
v i s i t e d  with t h e  MPs more frequently,  and received more personal favors. 
The di f ferences  between the two groups were consis tent  across  nat ions  
and impressively l a r g e  i n  magnitude. We are ,  therefore ,  convinced 
t h a t  t h e  l o c a l  notables const i tu ted  t h e  most a c t i v i s t  elements i n  t h e i r  
respect ive  conununities, providing a v i t a l  l i n k  between t h e  center  and 
peripheries.  Moreover, w e  can now say with some confidence t h a t  among 
t h e  th ree  countries Kenya had t h e  most extensive and in t imate  representa t ive  
linkages, frequently forged on the  bas i s  of se rv ice  a c t i v i t i e s  and c lose  
contacts.  
111. Cit izen Par t i c ipa t ion  
Elect ions of t h e  members t o  representa t ive  bodies provide oppor tuni t ies  
f o r  c i t i z e n s  t o  pa r t i c ipa te .  Beyond the  r e l a t i v e l y  simple and formal 
a c t  of voting,  MPs c r e a t e  s i g n i f i c a n t  pa r t i c ipa to ry  oppor tuni t ies  i n  
many other  ways. Elect ion campaigns draw a c t i v i s t  elements a s  campaign 
workers and involve a l a r g e  port ion of c i t i z e n s  i n  e lec t ion  rallies 
through which the  c i t i z e n s  a r e  exposed t o  d i r e c t  p o l i t i c a l  s t imul i .  
Moreover, the  MPs a s  the  intermediaries between t h e  government and t h e i r  
d i s t r i c t s  can educate c i t i z e n s  i n  t h e  a r t s  of lobbying, I f  t h e r e  were 
no l eg i s l a tu re ,  t h e  c i t i z e n  pa r t i c ipa t ion  of t h i s  kind would probably not  
e x i s t .  The developmental r o l e  of the  l e g i s l a t u r e  must be seen i n  t h i s  
context.  
TABLE 4  
Consti tuents '  Contact with MPs 
KENYA KOREA TURKEY 
C - - -  
Local Local Local 
Types of Contact Consti tuents  Notables Consti tuents  Notables Consti tuents  Notables 
How many times have 
you seen your MP (s)  
i n  t h e  l a s t  6  months? 
How many times have 
you seen your MP(s) 
i n  t h e  d i s t r i c t  
i n  t h e  l a s t  6  months? 
% of people who have 
ever ta lked t o  t h e  MP 
in  t h e  c a p i t a l  c i t y  
a of people who have 
talked personally t o  
t h e i r  MPs about some 
problems 
% of people who have 
mentioned s p e c i f i c  
things t h e  MP did 
f o r  t h e  d i s t r i c t  
% of people who 
mentioned t h a t  t h e  MP 
did something personally 
f o r  them 2 .6% 5 . 1 %  0 . 4 %  1 .5% 1 .3% 1 .4% 
A s i gn i f i c an t  pa r t  of c i t i z en  par t i c ipa t ion  revolvea around t h e  
l eg i s l a t u r e  and its members. To c i t e  a few examples, we note the  ac t a  
of voting, attendfng e lec t ion  r a l l i e s ,  dtscussing r e l a t i v e  m e r i t 6  of 
candidates i n  order t o  persuade ~ t h e r s ,  working a s  campaign s t a f f ,  
lobbying an MP f o r  community o r  p r iva te  i n t e r e s t s .  Given the  formal 
nature of voting and i t s  susceptabi l i ty  t o  mobilization, we regard other  
modes of pa r t i c ipa t ion  fostered by MPa a s  f a r  more important. This is 
because the  a c t s  of campaign ass i s tance  and lobbying require  a g rea te r  
p o l i t i c a l  sophis t ica t ion and therefore,  represent  a more genuine s e l f -  
a s s e r t i ve  behavior. 
In  Table 5 we repor t  the  pa r t i c ipa to ry  da ta  from the  th ree  countries.  
Voting par t i c ipa t ion  is uniformly high. Eighty-four percent voted i n  
the  National Assembly Election i n  Korea. In  Turkey and Kenya t h e i r  
respective voting r a t e s  were 80 percent and 67 percent. Election r a l l i e s  
aha drew an impressive r a t e  of par t ic ipat ion:  53% i n  Korea, 34% i n  
Turkey, and 51% in Kenya. Looking a t  more time consuming p o l i t i c a l  
a c t i v i t i e s  such a s  campaign work and d i r e c t  lobbying with MPs, it  comes 
a s  no surpr i se  t ha t  only a minority of a c t i v i s t s  were involved. However, 
we were impressed with the  r a t e s  of such a c t i v i t i e s  i n  t he  th ree  countries,  
especia l ly  i n  comparison with the  s imi lar  f igures  col lec ted i n  o ther  
advanced western countries.  
TABLE 5 
Levels of P o l i t i c a l  Par t i c ipa t ion  
(percentages) 
Ac t i v i t i e s  Korea Turkey Kenya 
Voting 
Voted i n  the  l a s t  e lec t ion  84 80 
Voted i n  the  e lec t ion  before 
the  l a s t  one 88 7 1 
Campaign a c t i v i t y  
Attended campaign r a l l i e s  5 3 34 
Persuaded others  how to  vote  3 5 24 
Ever worked f o r  a candidate 11 16 
Contacting o f f i c i a l s  
Contacted o f f i c i a l s  regarding 
l oca l  problems 12 2 3 
Contacted o f f i c i a l s  regarding 
nat ional  problems 5 13 
Contacted l e g i s l a t o r s  4 10 
There a r e  of course o ther  channels of pa r t i c ipa t ion .  But t h e  main 
point  t h a t  we wtsh t o  stress is t h a t  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i v i t i e s  engendered by 
t h e  l e g i s l a t i v e  process account f o r  a l a r g e  share  of c i t i z e n s t  t o t a l  
p o l i t i c a l  involvement. Had the re  been no functioning l e g i s l a t u r e s  i n  
these  countr ies ,  t h e i r  c i t i z e n s  would have been deprived of these  
pa r t i c ipa to ry  oppor tuni t ies  t h a t  they now enjoy. 
' I V .  'Resource 'Allocat ion 
There a r e  two p r inc ipa l  ways i n  which a l e g i s l a t u r e  can a f f e c t  
t h e  resource a l loca t ion .  One is through its lawmaking capacity,  e spec ia l ly  
through t h e  exerc ise  of its power over budgetary matters. The o ther  is 
through an individual  member's e f f o r t  t o  induce the  government funds t o  
h i s  d i s t r i c t .  Although the  l e g i s l a t u r e  has a formal power of appropriat ions 
it exerc ises  i n  f a c t  l i t t l e  con t ro l  over such matters i n  many developing 
countr ies .  Economic planning and spending p o l i c i e s  a r e  l a rge ly  determined 
by t h e  executive, while t h e  l e g i s l a t u r e  tends t o  approve these  government 
ac t ions  a s  a matter  of course without amending o r  modifying t h e i r  
contents  i n  any s i g n i f i c a n t  wag. Although l e g i s l a t u r e s  can i n  theory 
a f f e c t  the  a l l o c a t i v e  process, they appear i n  p r a c t i c e  t o  exerc ise  l i t t l e  
in£  luence i n  t h i s  way. 
The a l l o c a t i v e  r o l e  of t h e  l e g i s l a t u r e ,  i f  any, is l i k e l y  t o  be 
seen in its individual  members' constituency a c t i v i t i e s .  MPs a r e  everywhere 
expected t o  perform a c e r t a i n  degree of constituency service .  In  f a c t ,  
f o r  a majori ty of cons t i tuen t s  t h i s  aspect  of an MP's job is what is 
usually meant t o  be representat ion.  Recent s t u d i e s  of developing l e g i s l a t u r e s  
a l l  point  out  t h e  constituency se rv ice  a s  a s i n g l e  most important function 
of l e g i s l a t o r s .  Pa r t  of t h i s  constituency a c t i v i t y  involves a competition 
among MPs f o r  government resources. They t r y  t o  a t t r a c t  more public  funds 
t o  t h e i r  d i s t r i c t s  such a s  construct ion p ro jec t s ,  r u r a l  development 
schemes, indus t r i e s ,  educational and hea l th  ca re  f a c i l i t i e s .  Because 
they a r e  i n  a unique pos i t ion  t h a t  o b l i g a t e s  them t o  be responsive t o  
t h e  va r i ab le  needs of t h e i r  d i s t r i c t s ,  unl ike  those planners and 
bureaucrats i n  t h e  c e n t r a l  government who a r e  preoccupied with t h e  
growth aspects  of na t iona l  economy, MPs' e f f o r t  t o  obta in  government 
resources f o r  t h e i r  d i s t r i c t s  may r e s u l t  i n  a more equi table  regional  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  of wealth. 
A c l e a r  majorxty of MPs i n  a l l  t h r e e  countr ies  considered t h e i r  
a l l o c a t i v e  r o l e  a s  extremely important. For example, 71.4 percent of 
our Kenyan MPs ranked t h e i r  job of g e t t i n g  government p ro jec t s  a t  t h e  
top of t h e i r  important d u t i e s  (see Table 1). In  Turkey and Korea 59.7 
percent and 40 percent of t h e i r  MPs ra ted  t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  job a s  most 
important. On t he  o ther  hand, t h e i r  cons t i tuen t s  a l s o  s t r e s sed  t h e  
MPs' a l l o c a t i v e  ro le .  The cons t i tuen t s  i n  t h e  t h r e e  countr ies  expected 
t h e i r  MPs t o  be a c t i v e  i n  t h e i r  a l l o c a t i v e  r o l e  and t h e i r  MPs responded 
by taking t h i s  r o l e  ser ious ly .  
I n  an e f f o r t  t o  determine t h e  amount of time each MP ac tua l ly  
spends t o  provide goods and aerviceq f o r  h i a  d i s t r i c t ,  we asked him:  ' h t  
types of problems occupy mst of your time?" The responses t o  the  
question ere sumraarized i n  Table 6. I n  a l l  th ree  countries a majority 
mentioned the  problems of t h e i r  d i s t r i c t s .  I n  Kenya a preponderant 
majority of 82 percent  indicated such problems, suggesting a g rea te r  
sa l i ence  of constituency se rv ice  work among the  Kenyan MPs than it is 
elsewhere. It is not  too d i f f i c u l t  t o  imagine that p a r t  of t h e  d i s t r i c t  
problems t h a t  MPs spoke of involve t h e i r  e f f o r t s  t o  br ing both mater ia l  
and other  tangible  benef i t s  t o  t h e i r  d i s t r i c t s .  
TABLE 6 
Problems Occupying Leg i s la to r ' s  Time 
( i n  percentages) 
Types of Problems Kenya Korea Turkey 
Problems i n  d i s t r i c t  82.1 57.3 51.0 
National problems 7.1 40.2 34.6 
Both equally 7.1 2.4 13.5 
Evades quest ions,  NA,DK 3.6 0.0 1.0 
(N) = (28) (82) (104) 
The a l l o c a t i v e  r o l e  of MPs could be analyzed from t h e  view point  
of t h e i r  const i tuents ,  too. To begin with, much of an MP's constituency 
se rv ice  is t h e  r e s u l t  of requests  o r ig ina t ing  among d i s t r i c t  voters .  They 
may express t h e i r  concerns f o r  t h e  inadequate f a c i l i t i e s  of public education, 
the  lack of heal th  care centers ,  t h e  retarded economic development i n  t h e  
area,  o r  t h e  need f o r  paved roads. Before an MP can a c t  i n  response t o  
these  needs, constituency requests  must be communicated t o  him. I n  t h e  
survey we asked bath l o c a l  notables and const i tuents  whether they had 
ever talked t o  t h e i r  MPs personally i n  t h e  recent  6 months. We did  not  
expect t o  f ind  many cons t i tuen t s  having such an experience, because i f  
they had indeed any such request  they were more l i k e l y  t o  channel i t  
through t h e i r  community leaders  such a s  v i l l a g e  heads o r  o ther  notables 
who were i n  c lose  touch with politicians. As shown i n  Table 7 r e l a t i v e l y  
few const i tuent8  had d i r e c t  contacts  with t h e i r  W s  (roughly between 5-11%) 
but  among t h e  l o c a l  notables nearly hal f  had experiences of t a lk ing  t o  
t h e i r  MPs personally. It seems qu i t e  c l e a r  t h a t  the  bulk of problemss 
that people br ing t o  t h e i r  MPs' a t t e n t i o n  were normally mediated by 
t h e i r  prominent l o c a l  leaders.  
What kind of problems do people take t o  t h e i r  MPa? The data i n  Table 8 
show tha t  a s i zab le  proportion of these problems were of the  public nature  
involving the  i n t e r e s t s  of a whole v i l l a g e  o r  a l a rge r  d i s t r i c t  community. 
In  Turkey such problems accounted f o r  two-thirds of a l l  the  problems. I n  
Kenya and Korea they accounted f o r  more than one-third. There is  no doubt 
t h a t  much of the problems c l a a s i f i e d  a a  af the public nature has something 
t o  do wfth the  Npork barre l"  projecta.  
TABLE 7 
Have You Ever Talked t o  An M.P. 
About Any Problem 
(Percentages) 
KENYA KOREA TURKEY 
Const. Notables Const. Notables Const. Notables 
Y e s  7.2 47.4 5.4 45.6 10.7 64.8 
No 92.8 32.6 94.6 54.4 89.3 35.2 
(N=3381) (N=342) (Nm1724) (Nx377) (N=1950) (N=287) 
TABLE 8 
What Problem Have You Talked About 
With Legis la tor  
(Percentages) 
KENYA KOREA TURKEY 
Const. Notables Const. Notables Const. Notables 
Personal 
Problems 59.1 37.7 54.2 58.8 13.2 3.5 
Public Problems 39.7 61.1 32,5 39.9 66.5 67.8 
Both 0.0 0.0 13.3 1.3 20.3 28.7 
An impressive number of the conati tuents were aware of material and 
other tangible benef i ts  tha t  t he i r  MPs have brought t o  t h e i r  d i s t r i c t s  
(see Table 9 ) .  With the exceptfon of Korea, nearly anechalf of the  Kenyans 
and well  wer two-thirds sf' the  Turkish const i tuents  cauld mention a t  l e aa t  
one or  more thihga t ha t  t h e i r  Wa.had done fo r  the d i s t r i c t s .  In  contrast ,  
barely fourteen percent of the  Korean constituento could name such a c t i v i t i e s  
of t h e i r  HPs. It is alao in te res t ing  t o  note that  t he  loca l  notables of 
a l l  three  countries saw greater achievements i n  t h e i r  MPs' a c t i v i t i e s  
than did the  rank-and-file constituents. Thie I M ~  i n  par t  r e f l e c t  t h e i r  
greater famiLiarity with what t he i r  MPs  actual ly  do. A t  any r a t e ,  it  is 
evident t ha t  t he  MPs apend a good deal  of t h e i r  time attending t o  t h e i r  
a l loca t ive  ro le ,  Also, t h e i r  consti tuents were acutely cognizant of 
t h e i r  a l loca t ive  role.  
Despite some s ign i f ican t  var ia t ions  between countries and between 
hdividim% Ws of the same country, t h e i r  a l loca t ive  a c t i v i t i e s  nevertheless 
comprise a main par t  of t he i r  dut ies ,  I f  it were not fo r  t h e i r  a l loca t ive  
ro le ,  the d i s t r ibu t ion  of government resources would have taken a 
d i f fe ren t  shape i n  these countries probably less in the direct ion of 
regional equity, 
TABLE 9 
What Has Your Legislator Done 
For Your Connuunity 
(Percentages) 
KENYA KOBBA TURKEY 
Cons t i- Cons t i- Cons ti- 
tuents Notables tuedbs Notables tuents Rotables 
Mentioned 3 t o  
5 things 11.0 15.4 1.1 3.8 5.0 10.8 
Mentioned 2 
things 15.6 24.9 3 .4  7 .3  8 .0  14.6 
Mentioned 1 
thing 22.1 32.9 9.5 16.5 13.0 22.6 
Mentioned 
nothing 
or  N.A. 51.4 26.7 85.9 72.4 74.0 51.9 
V. Legitimation 
The l eg i s l a t u r e  can p lay  a c r i t i c a l  r o l e  i n  legit imating t he  regime. 
Even in countries where t he  powera o f  legislature is reduced t o  i ts bare 
minimum, a e l d ~ m  do the  leaders of these regimes do away with i t  en t i r e l y ,  
Occasionally, l eg i s l a t u r e s  have.been aboliahed following mi l i t a ry  coups 
o r  r e v ~ l u t i o n s .  But i n  most cases they were restored a f t e r  a r e l a t i ve ly  
br ief  in terrupt ion.  A l l  of t h i s  suggest t h a t  various regimes, whether 
democratic o r  author i tar ian ,  see aome advantages i n  having a representat ive 
body. One advantage tha t  they may see  is i ts  legit imating function. Otherwise, 
i t  would not  have been fetained i n  many au thor i t a r i an  p o l i t i c a l  systems. 
The legit imating function can be described i n  several  ways a s  
discussed e a r l i e r :  l a t en t ,  manifest, t h e  sa fe ty  valve, and t he  spil l-over 
e f fec t .  However, w e  w i l l  concentrate on the  two aspects of legit imation,  
namely t he  manifest and spil l-over functions because t he  relevant  data 
a r e  available.  The manifest function r e f e r s  t o  the  l e g i s l a t i v e  a c t i v i t i e s  
t h a t  d i r ec t l y  legi t imate  the  po l ic ies  and act ions  of government, These 
a c t i v i t i e s  may include t h e  l e g i s l a t i v e  approvals of government proposed 
l eg i s la t ion ,  the  endorsements of government po l ic ies ,  and individual  
members' e f f o r t  t o  explain t o  t h e i r  const i tuents  why these po l ic ies  a r e  
appropriate. The sp i l l -over  e f f ec t  r e f e r s  t o  the  l i n k  between c i t i zens '  
support f o r  t he  l eg i s l a t u r e  and t h e i r  bas ic  a t t i t u d e s  toward other pa r t s  
of the  government. 
In  most countries the  executives tend t o  set the  l e g i s l a t i v e  agenda: 
they formulate most of the  b i l l s  considered by the  l eg i s l a t u r e  and the  
r a t e s  of government b i l l s  enacted i n  the  l eg i s l a t u r e  tend t o  be subs tan t ia l ly  
higher than p r iva te  members' b i l l s .  I n  the  Kenyan National Assembly only 
a s ing le  b i l l  was introduced by a p r iva te  member during t he  1963-69 period, 
with t he  remainder or ig inat ing i n  the  executive branch.21 In  the  Korean 
case, not on$y do the  government b i l l s  outnumber p r iva te  members' b i l l s  
but a l so ,  show a greater  r a t e  of success i n  t h e i r  enactment.22 The chief 
a c t i v i t y  of t h e  l eg i s l a t u r e  i n  these two countries almost seems t o  be one 
of legit imating po l ic ies  f o r  t he  executive. 
Moreover, many l@s regarded the  job of explaining government po l ic ies  
t o  t h e i r  const i tuents  a s  an important pa r t  of t h e i r  dut ies .  I n  Turkey 
nearly 70 percent of the  MPs considered it a s  t h e i r  foremost duty (see Table 1) .  
I n  other two countries it is regarded a s  less important: 30 percent i n  Korea 
and 11 percent i r r  .Kenya, respectively.  Although the re  a r e  marked var ia t ions  
between country, i t  is nevertheless important t o  note t h a t  some MPs spend 
a good deal  of t h e i r  time and energy t o  j u s t i f y  t he  ac t ions  of government. 
const i tuents '  support f o r  the  l eg i s l a t u r e  can a f f e c t  t h e i r  a t t i t u d e s  
touard other  pa r t s  of government, ul t imately contributing t o  the  regime 
e t ab i l i t y .  A va r ie ty  of f a c to r s  can determine a c i t i z en ' s  support f o r  
the  representa t ive  body, including h i s  demographic charac te r i s t i c s ,  t he  
degree of h i s  contact  with the MP, h i s  knowledge and expectation of the  
l eg i a l a t i ve  i n s t i t u t i o n ,  h i s  s a t i e f ac t i on  with l e g i a l a t i v e  performance. Of 
a l l  these var iables  two were of par tscular  imgortance; the  degree of 
s a t i s f ac t i on  with l e g i s l a t i v e  performance and the  l e v e l  of oneta knowledge 
about the  legialature.23 
To test the  apill-over e f f ec t  it ia necessary t o  measure t h e  amount' 
of support t ha t  cLtizens accord t he  l eg ia la tu re .  Our operational  measure 
of the  aupport i a  based on a ba t t e ry  af questions included i n  the  survey. 
Each of these questions w a s  deaigned t o  d e t e m h e  whether t he  const i tuenta  
consider i t  both necessary and des i rab le  t o  maintain a l e g i s l a t i v e  body, 
whether they regard the  l e g i s l a t u r e  aa one of the  bes t  things ever established 
s ince  independence, whether they bel ieve  t h e i r  country would be worse s f f  
i f  it were abolished o r  reduced i n  s i z e ,  o r  whether they bel ieve  it  has 
played an important and useful  ro le .  In Table 10 we display these questions 
and the  const i tuents '  responses from the  th ree  countries.  
TABLE 10 
Responses t o  Support Questions i n  Kenya, 
Korea and Turkey 
(percentages) 
KOREA (N=2274) TKRK@l (Nm2007) KENYA (N=4 1 2 8) 
Support- Negat* N.A.. Support- Negat- N.A. Support- Negat- N.A. 
- - ive  ive  or, i ve  l ve  &g i v e  ive  o r  
Support Items D.K. D.K. D.K. 
Do we r e a l l y  
need a legis-  
l a t u r e?  8 1 
What d i f ference 
has it  made t o  
t h i s  country? 67 
A r e  w e  b e t t e r  off  
because we have 
a l eg ia la tu re?  63 
Is it one of the  
bes t  things es- 
tablished s i nce  
independence? 42 
Could w e  do j u s t  a s  
w e l l  with half  a s  
many MPs? 20 (No scored a s  
support. ) 
3 16 93 2 5 not  asked 
8 2 5 8 3 3 14 6 1 13 
9 2 8 80 8 12 64 8 
13 4 5 90 2 8 71 8 
30 50 51 34 15 not  asked 
The da ta  suggest seve ra l  conclusions. F i r s t ,  t h e  l e v e l  of l e g i s l a t i v e  
aupport is general ly high i n  a l l  countr ies ,  perhaps su rp r i s ing ly  high f o r  
an i n s t i t u t i a n  that is ne i the r  highly i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d  nor very powerful. 
In  Korea and.Turkey over four - f i f ths  of those interviewed indica ted  t h a h  
the  l e g i s l a t u r e  i s  a necessary i n s t i t u t i o n .  Similarly,  a t  l e a s t  th ree - f i f ths  
of a l l  cons t i tuen t s  believed t h a t  they are b e t t e r  of f  because they have 
a l e g i s l a t u r e  and that it has  played a s i g n i f i c a n t  and use fu l  r o l e ,  Secondly, 
a  small percentage of the  cons t i tuen t s  gave negative answers, suggesting t h a t  
t h e  l e g i s l a t u r e  fs not  a  t a r g e t  f o r  widespread public  h o s t i l i t y .  The main 
line of d iv is ion  l i e s  between those who gave p o s i t i v e  answers and those 
who did  not  know o r  did not  have any opinions, Therefore, a  majori ty of 
t h e  population were e i t h e r  support ive a5  the  l e g i s l a t u r e  o r  ind i f fe ren t  
t o  it and only r e l a t i v e l y  few people regarded it with h o s t i l i t y .  Thirdly, 
of t h e  th ree  cauntr ies  t h e  Turkish people gave the  s t ronges t  support,  a  
f inding t h a t  might have been ant ic ipa ted  given the  long h i s t o r y  of he r  
l e g i s l a t u r e  and t h e  influence t h a t  body wields i n  t h e  Turkish p o l i t i c a l  system. 
W e  now know t h a t  a  majori ty of t h e  cons t i tuen t s  i n  t h e  t h r e e  countr ies  
a r e  bas ica l ly  support ive of t h e i r  l e g i s l a t u r e s .  How much of t h i s  support 
s p i l l s  over i n t o  t h e i r  a t t i t u d e s  toward o ther  p a r t s  of government? W e  
do not  have adequate da ta  t o  determine i ts  causal  l i n k s  d i r e c t l y .  However, 
we can e s t a b l i s h  a co r re la t ion  between t h e  l e v e l  of l e g i s l a t i v e  support 
and t h e  support f o r  o the r  p a r t s  of government by showing t h a t  a  majori ty of 
c i t i z e n s  s e e  various branches of government a s  an  indis t inguishable  whole. 
I f  a  c i t i z e n  supports t h e  l e g i s l a t u r e ,  he is very l i k e l y  t o  support o ther  
branches af  governnent j u s t  a s  much because he does not  s e e  them a s  
separa te  e n t i t i e s .  We asked t h e  cons t i tuents :  "Do you th ink t h e  National 
Assembly does something very d i f f e r e n t  from other  p a r t s  of the  government, 
and i f  so ,  what?" A s i z a b l e  percentage of the  adu l t  population i n  each 
country rep l i ed  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  no d i f ferences  (see Table 11). Roughly 
three-fourths of both Kenyans and Koreans saw t h e i r  l e g i s l a t u r e  a s  an 
indis t inguishable  p a r t  of t h e  government. In  Turkey t h e  proportion is 
smaller  and y e t ,  near ly  44 percent d id  not  d i s t ingu i sh  t h e  l e g i s l a t u r e  
from other  p a r t s  of t h e  government. To t h e  ex ten t  t h a t  a  l e g i s l a t u r e  is 
capable of e n l i s t i n g  popular support it can con t r ibu te  t o  t h e  legitimacy of 
t h e  regime, e spec ia l ly  among t h e  segment of t h e  population who do not  
d i s t ingu i sh  t h e  l e g i s l a t i v e  branch from o the r  p a r t s  of t h e  government. 
TABLE 11 
Percentages of Ci t izens  Who Did Not Dist inguish 
Legis la ture  From Other P a r t s  of Government 
TURKEY 
Tota l  
( N )  
V I .  Conclusions 
We have seen tha t  l eg i s l a t u r e s  could contribute t o  development' through 
a var ie ty  of functions t h a t  they perform. Drawing upon t he  survey data  
col lec ted i n  th ree  countries we  have analyzed four key l e g i s l a t i v e  
functions. Representation a s  a mechanism l inking the  po l i t i c i an s  a t  the  
center  and the  ordinary people at per ipher ies  promotes t he  in tegra t ive  
process. Both l e g i s l a t o r s  and t h e i r  const i tuents  i n  t he  th ree  countries 
regarded representat ion ch ie f ly  a s  a re la t ionsh ip  through which support 
and services  a r e  exchanged. MPs t r i e d  t o  develop a c lose  t i e  with t h d r  
consti tuencies and broaden t h e i r  support bases by involving mre of t h e i r  
voters.  Aa a r e s u l t  those elements of t h e  population who would otherwise 
be l e f t  out  of p o l i t i c s  were brought i n to  t h e  representa t ive  linlmges. 
k c e s e i b i l i t y  and responsiveness of MPs f o s t e r  c i t i z e n  par t ic ipat ion.  
CZtizens look upon t h e i r  MPs a s  t h e i r  t r ibunes  and seek MPs' help fo r  t h e i r  
grievances o r  probleme. They t r y  t o  influence the  government ac t ions  
through t he  mediation of t h e i r  representat ivee.  Legislatures expand 
par t i c ipa t ion  because they c rea te  opportunit ies f o r  periodic electionr, 
and demand-making behaviors t ha t  are channeled through MPs. The formal 
e l e c to r a l  opportunit ies created by t he  l eg i s l a t u r e  may be of t h e  secondary 
importance, fo r  much of the  voting par t i c ipa t ion  could be t h e  r e s u l t s  of 
mobilization. The more genuine par t i c ipa t ion  of t he  self-conscious and 
se l f -asse r t ive  sort derives from non-electoral par t ic ipat ion.  Legie la tars  
provide opportunit ies f o r  such c i t i z e n  par t i c ipa t ion  by o f fe r ing  themselves 
a s  an ea s i l y  access ible  and responsive t a rge t  f o r  demand-making actions.  
'Rro aspects of MPs' a l l oca t i ve  r o l e  were considered. They could 
influence the  resource a l loca t ion  by t h e i r  co l l ec t ive  act ions  such a s  
lawmaking. I n  most countr ies  however the  i n i t i a t i v e s  f o r  l eg i s l a t i on  and 
spending po l ic ies  o r ig ina te  f o r  t he  most pa r t  y i t h  t he  executive. The 
a l loca t ive  r o l e  of individual  MPs appears t o  be f a r  more important. They 
compete with each other  t o  induce more public funds and p ro jec t s  t o  t h e i r  
d i s t r i c t s .  Often, because t h e i r  success i n  bringing both mater ia l  and 
tangible  benefi t4 t o  t h e i r  const i tuents  is d i r e c t l y  linked t o  t h e i r  
ree lect ion,  they t r y  t o  do t h e i r  bes t  t o  s a t i s f y  the  economic needs of 
t h e i r  d i s t r i c t s .  I n  a l l  three  countries t h e  a l loca t ive  r o l e  was regarded 
a s  the  s i ng l e  m e t  important aspect of the  l e g i s l a t i v e  r o l e  by both MPs 
themselves gad the  consti tuents.  Because MPs a r e  more s ens i t i ve  t o  t h e  
var iab le  needs of t h e i r  geographic consti tuencies than a t e  t he  bureaucrats 
i n  the  cen t r a l  government, t h e i r  a l l oca t i ve  behaviors may lead t o  a more 
equitable regional  d i s t r i bu t i on  of resources. I n  t h i s  sense, MPs cons t i tu te  
a countervailing force agains t  t h e  growth s t ra tegy  of ten  adopted by the  
planners and o f f i c i a l s  i n  t he  cen t r a l  government. 
S 
Legislatures can legi t imate  t h e  act ions  of the  government. A government 
policy, formally approved i n  t h e  form of a law by an elected body, w i l l  be 
. a  
regarded by c i t i z e n s  a s  more legi t imate  than otherwise. This is probably 
one of the reasons why l e g i s l a t u r e s  a r e  maintained even i n  most au toc ra t i c  
regimes. A w e l l  functioning l e g i s l a t u r e  can a l s o  enhance the  legitimacy 
of the regime through what we  have ca l led  its "spill-over" e f f e c t .  Ci t izens  
may develop a pos i t ive  a t t i t u d e  toward the  l e g i s l a t u r e ,  regarding it  a s  a 
valuable and useful  p o l i t i c a l  i n s t i t u t i o n .  The reservoir  of good w i l l  and 
support t h a t  the  population builds up could be extended t o  o ther  p a r t s  
of the  government. A l e g i s l a t u r e  which meets t h e  needs and expectations 
of a majority of c i t i z e n s  helps legi t imate  t h e  regime i t s e l f .  We have 
seen t h a t  a majority of the  const i tuents  i n  t h e  th ree  countries were 
bas ica l ly  supportive of t h e i r  l e g i s l a t u r e s  and t h a t  they saw t h e  l e g i s l a t u r e  
and other  p a r t s  of the  government as  an indist inguishable whole. Therefore, 
t h e i r  support f o r  the  l e g i s l a t u r e ,  we argued, would be s p i l l e d  over, so 
t o  speak, t o  t h e  regime a s  a whole. 
The po ten t i a l  contr ibutions of a l e g i s l a t u r e  t o  development and 
modernization depend upon what key functions and how much of them i t  performs. I n  
the th ree  countr ies  where we  conducted our study, we  found t h a t  the  l e g i s l a t u r e s  
were ac t ive ly  involved i n  crea t ing the  representa t ive  l inkages,  t h e  
oppor tuni t ies  f o r  more autonomous and se l f -asse r t ive  c i t i z e n  pa r t i c ipa t ion ,  
the  channels which promote a more equi table  regional  d i s t r i b u t i o n  af  resources, 
and the  p o l i t i c a l  atmosphere which enhances c i t i z e n s '  support f o r  t h e  
regime. Although t h e  l e g i s l a t u r e  i n  each country performed a l l  of these 
functions i n  somewhat va r iab le  manners, they nevertheless were a l l  engaged 
s i g n i f i c a n t l y - i n  representat ion,  resource a l loca t ion ,  legi t imat ion,  and 
par t ic ipat ion.  The l e g i s l a t u r e s  contr ibute  t o  development t o  the  extent  t h a t  
they perform these  functions. 
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